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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




The County of Cape May ("the County") appeals the 
District Court's ruling awarding the plaintif f, Pamela Eaves 
("Eaves"), post-judgment interest on the Court's award of 
$254,248.57 in attorney's fees and expenses fr om August 
11, 1998, the date that the District Court first stated that 
she was entitled to such an award "in an amount to be 
determined pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)." The legal 
issue presented in this employment discrimination action is 
whether post-judgment interest on a judgment awarding 
attorney's fees and expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
S 2000e-5(k) runs from the date that the District Court 
rules initially that the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees, 
or alternatively, from the date that the District Court 
actually quantifies the amount awarded, wher e those 
determinations are made at separate times. 
 
Based upon our construction of the applicable federal 
post-judgment interest statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1961(a), we hold 
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that post-judgment interest on an attor ney's fee award runs 
from the date that the District Court actually quantifies the 
award. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court's 
January 27, 2000 order insofar as it awar ded post- 
judgment interest from August 11, 1998, and will remand 
the matter to the District Court for the entry of an 
appropriate order. However, because we find no merit in the 
County's other challenges relating to certain rulings made 
in the Court's January 27, 2000 order, we will affirm those 
rulings without further discussion.1 
 
II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
Eaves is an American citizen of Chinese national origin. 
She was employed as the Treasurer of Cape May County, 
but was demoted to County Comptroller on July 8, 1994. 
After Eaves filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") based on 
her demotion and an alleged hostile work envir onment, the 
County eliminated her County Comptroller position. 
 
Eaves then filed a Complaint in the District Court on 
August 30, 1995, alleging that the County, its Boar d of 
Freeholders, William E. Sturm and Edmund Grant violated 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 
SS 621-634 (1998) ("ADEA"), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e to e-17 (1998) ("Title VII"), and 
the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 10:5-1 to -42 (West 1993) ("NJLAD"). On May 1, 1998, a 
jury found in Eaves's favor on the Title VII and NJLAD 
retaliation claim against the County, but found for the 
defendants on the remaining claims.2  On May 11, 1998, 
Eaves filed post-trial motions seeking prejudgment interest 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. In this appeal, the County also challenged the District Court's rulings 
with respect to the (1) 25 percent downwar d adjustment of the lodestar 
amount given plaintiff 's limited success; and (2) 15 percent contingency 
enhancement applied pursuant to the New Jersey Law Against 
Discrimination. 
 
2. The jury deliberated only on Eaves's T itle VII and NJLAD claims based 
on the demotion, hostile work environment and r etaliation, because the 
Court dismissed the additional claims initially pleaded in the Complaint 
on defendants' motions for summary judgment and for a directed verdict. 
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pursuant to Title VII, and attorney's fees under Title VII 
and the NJLAD. On August 11, 1998, the District Court 
entered judgment on the jury verdict in favor of Eaves, and 
against the County, for $90,000, together with pr ejudgment 
interest in the amount of $12,602.46, "together with 
attorney's fees and costs in an amount to be determined 
pursuant to Rule 54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P." App. at 5. The order 
accompanying the judgment stated that "attor ney's fees and 
costs shall be awarded in an amount to be deter mined by 
the court upon plaintiff 's presently pending motion." App. 
at 8. 
 
On January 27, 2000, the District Court resolved the 
outstanding motion for attorney's fees.3 After reviewing 
Eaves's counsels' billing records, the Court calculated the 
lodestar, reduced it by 25 percent to account for Eaves's 
limited success, applied a contingency enhancement of 15 
percent under the NJLAD, and quantified the attorney's fee 
award. Ultimately, the Court awarded plaintiff 's counsel 
$254,248.57 in fees and expenses. It also addr essed the 
question of post-judgment interest on the awar d. We 
recount the Court's analysis on this point: 
 
        In the Judgment entered on August 11, 1998, the 
       Court entered "judgment in favor of the plaintiff and 
       against the defendant, County of Cape May, in the 
       amount of $90,000.00 together with attorney's fees and 
       costs in an amount to be determined pursuant to Rule 
       54(d), Fed. R. Civ. P." The amount of fees and related 
       expenses has, more than 16 months later , been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The motion actually sought attorney's fees, "expenses," and "costs of 
suit." The District Court described the "expenses" as including 
"deposition transcript fees, expert witness fees, medical reports, 
investigation fees, photocopying, and binding." Items designated as 
"costs" were those permitted under 28 U.S.C. S 1920, including the filing 
fee, trial transcript fees and witness fees. See  App. at 10-11. 
Ultimately, 
the Court allowed post-judgment interest on the combined amount of 
attorney's fees and expenses, but not costs. Throughout this opinion, we 
will treat the attorney's fees and expenses aspect of the Court's order as 
a single attorney's fee award, as it is clear that the Court awarded those 
amounts designated as "expenses" as part of the "reasonable attorney's 
fee" allowable under 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(k). See Abrams v. Lightolier 
Inc., 
50 F.3d 1204, 1225-26 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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       determined. Since the attorney's fees were determined 
       as of the judgment date (August 11, 1998), the plaintiff 
       is also entitled to recover interest upon that sum since 
       that date, as post-judgment interest accounting for 
       delay in payment. It was the Court's intent, in entering 
       the Judgment on August 11, 1998, that the plaintif f 
       was found to be entitled to recover her attor ney's fees, 
       with only the amount to be determined. The 
       accompanying Order will therefore amend the August 
       11, 1998, Judgment to insert this amount, together 
       with post-judgment interest from August 11, 1998. 
       This adjustment further recognizes that plaintiff and 
       her counsel have been deprived of the benefit of the 
       payment of this sum since it was due and that the fee 
       award is calculated upon plaintiff 's counsel's 1998 
       billing rates rather than current rates. 
 
App. at 56. On the same date, the Court enter ed the 
"Amended Judgment" which incorporated its quantification 
of the attorney's fee award, and its statement that post- 
judgment interest on the jury verdict and the fee award was 
to run from August 11, 1998. App. at 58. The County filed 




The County argues that the District Court err ed in 
"backdating" the post-judgment interest award on the fee 
amount to August 11, 1998, the date the Court or dered 
that attorney's fees and costs would be awar ded "in an 
amount to be determined" by the Court. It contends that 
the Court's decision to award post-judgment interest from 
that date ignores the fact that the amount of the award was 
not quantified until nearly a year and a half later, and 
unfairly penalizes the County because the delay was 
apparently caused by court backlog rather than dilatory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The District Court exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the 
federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, 1343, and over the state 
law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1367. W e have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and exer cise plenary review over the 
challenged ruling. Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 
97 (3d Cir. 1993) . 
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tactics on the County's part. The County cites Foley v. City 
of Lowell, 948 F.2d 10, 21-23 (1st Cir . 1991), and 
MidAmerica Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 962 F .2d 1470, 1475 
(10th Cir. 1992), in support of its position, claiming that 
both decisions held that post-judgment inter est on an 
attorney's fee award accrues from the date the amount of 
the award is quantified. It further asserts that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. 
Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827 (1990), is consistent with the 
reasoning in Foley and MidAmerica . Appellant's Br. at 15- 
16. 
 
Eaves responds that "the majority rule among the circuit 
courts of appeals is that post-judgment `inter est accrues 
from the date that the party becomes unconditionally 
entitled to fees, even if those fees are not yet quantified.' " 
Appellee's Br. at 21 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 
1273, 1275 (8th Cir. 1991); Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 
760 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Copper Liquor , Inc. v. Adolph Coors 
Co., 701 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc) (per 
curiam), overruled in part on other grounds by Int'l 
Woodworkers of Am. v. Champion Int'l Corp.  790 F.2d 1174 
(5th Cir. 1986), aff 'd sub nom. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. 
Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987)). In other words, 
according to Eaves, post-judgment inter est accrues on an 
attorney's fee award "from the date establishing the right to 
the award, not the date of the judgment establishing its 
quantum." Appellee's Br. at 21-22 (citing Mathis, 857 F.2d 
at 760). The justification for commencing the post-judgment 
interest period from the earlier of two judgments is 
grounded in equitable considerations: 
 
       "[Postponing the accrual of post-judgment inter est] 
       would effectively reduce the judgment for attorney's 
       fees and costs, because a certain sum of money paid at 
       a certain time in the future is worth less than the same 
       sum of money paid today. Failing to allow awar ds of 
       attorney's fees to bear interest would give parties 
       against whom such awards have been enter ed an 
       artificial and undesirable incentive to appeal or 
       otherwise delay payment." 
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Appellee's Br. at 22 (quoting Jenkins, 931 F.2d at 1276). 
Eaves claims that these same policy considerations should 
guide us in determining the date from which post-judgment 
interest should run in this case because the end result-- 
the delay in receipt of funds rightfully due to her counsel-- 
is the same, regardless of whether the delay was caused by 
the District Court or a litigious defendant.5 
 
Preliminarily, we point out that the County does not 
dispute that post-judgment interest under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1961(a) accrues on a judgment awarding attorney's fees to 
a prevailing party such as Eaves just as it would any other 
"money judgment" to which S 1961(a) applies. R.W.T. v. 
Dalton, 712 F.2d 1225, 1234-35 (8th Cir . 1983), abrogated 
on other grounds by Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 834-35; 
Spain v. Mountanos, 690 F.2d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1982); see 
Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. W elfare, 758 F.2d 
897, 927 (3d Cir. 1985) (allowing post-judgment interest to 
accrue on attorney's fee award; analysis proceeded on 
premise that post-judgment interest on an attorney's fee 
award was available); Devex Corp. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 749 
F.2d 1020, 1026-27 (3d Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's 
holding that post-judgment interest statute applies to 
award of costs). Thus, our inquiry is dir ected only to the 
date from which post-judgment interest should run where 
there ostensibly are two "judgments" pertaining to an 
attorney's fee award. 
 
While we have interpreted and applied the federal post- 
judgment interest statute on several occasions, 6 we have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We note that the circumstances of this case are unusual in that the 
delay between the District Court's first and second orders spanned 
approximately seventeen months. Moreover , it is not disputed that the 
County did not attempt to delay the Court's quantification of the amount 
due, but instead asked the Court several times to enter a final judgment 
on Eaves's attorney's fee petition several times throughout the 
seventeen-month period. 
 
6. See, e.g., Christian v. Joseph, 15 F.3d 296, 298-99 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(finding that Virgin Islands post-judgment interest statute and 28 U.S.C. 
S 1961(a) were analogous and stating that, like S 1961(a), Virgin Islands 
statute provides for automatic accrual of post-judgment interest); Dunn 
v. Hovic, 13 F.3d 58, 60-62 (3d Cir . 1993) (allowing post-judgment 
 
                                7 
  
not yet confronted the precise question before us in this 
case. And, as is evident from the discussion that follows, 
there is no consensus among the Courts of Appeals that 
have addressed the issue. Eaves correctly states that the 
"majority view," which has been adopted by the Courts of 
Appeals for the Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh and Federal 
Circuits, is that post-judgment interest on an attorney's fee 
award runs from the date that the district court enters a 
judgment finding that the prevailing party is entitled to 
such an award, or from the date that, by operation of law, 
the prevailing plaintiff becomes entitled to fees, even if the 
amount of the award is not fixed in that judgment. 
Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 332 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
interest to accrue from date of district court's entry of judgment on jury 
verdict despite partial remittitur in district court and further 
remittitur 
of punitive damage award on appeal); Loughman, 6 F.3d at 97-100 
(finding that plaintiffs were entitled to post-judgment interest accruing 
from date of original judgment rather than fr om date of judgment 
entered after damages retrial or fr om date of mandate issued after first 
appeal); In re Lower Lake Erie Iron Ore Antitrust Litig., 998 F.2d 1144, 
1177-78 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that S 1961 does not mandate that 
judgment from which interest is calculated be final judgment); Bonjorno 
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 865 F.2d 566, 571-72 (3d Cir. 1989) 
(holding that post-judgment interest on damages award began to run as 
of date of second jury verdict on damages, which was then vacated and 
subsequently reinstated, rather than as of date that jury either delivered 
first liability verdict or first damages verdict, or date on which Court 
of 
Appeals issued mandate), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, Kaiser Aluminum, 
494 U.S. at 827; Poleto v. Consol. Rail Corp. , 826 F.2d 1270, 1280-81 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (holding that post-judgment inter est on jury verdict began to 
run from date of verdict rather than district court's entry of judgment), 
abrogated by Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 827; Brock v. Richardson, 
812 F.2d 121, 125-26 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that back pay award under 
Fair Labor Standards Act should be presumed to carry post-judgment 
interest, unless equities in particular case r equire otherwise); 
Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 927 (allowing post-judgment 
interest to run from date that district court ruled that plaintiffs were 
entitled to fees and awarded quantified amount of fees where court of 
appeals affirmed award in part and vacated it in part for recalculation); 
Devex Corp., 749 F.2d at 1026 (holding that district court did not abuse 
its discretion in awarding post-judgment interest on award of taxable 
costs). 
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& n.24 (5th Cir. 1995); Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d 
1386, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1995); BankAtlantic Inc. v. Blythe 
Eastman Paine Webber, 12 F.3d 1045, 1052-53 (11th Cir. 
1994); Jenkins, 931 F.2d at 1277; Fox Indus. Inc. v. 
Structural Pres. Sys. Inc., 922 F .2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir. 
1991); Mathis, 857 F.2d at 760; Copper Liquor, 701 F.2d at 
545. In reaching their result, the leading cases have relied 
principally upon the policy underlying the post-judgment 
interest statute: compensation of the plaintif f (and the 
attorney) for the loss of the use of the money. By contrast, 
the "minority view," adopted by the Courts of Appeals for 
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, is that, where the district 
court enters an order stating that the pr evailing party is 
entitled to a fee award but does not quantify the amount of 
the award until a later date, post-judgment interest does 
not begin to accrue until the Court fixes the amount of the 
award.7 MidAmerica, 962 F.2d at 1476 (adopting rule that 
post-judgment interest begins to accrue when court enters 
judgment setting amount of fees owed based upon 
reasoning in Kaiser Aluminum); Fleming v. County of Kane, 
898 F.2d 553, 565 (7th Cir. 1990) (awarding interest from 
date amount was fixed, stating that "prior to the date the 
judgment on attorney's fees was entered, plaintiff 's 
attorney's claim for unpaid attorney's fees was unliquidated 
and, as such, not entitled to interest"). 8 We do not find the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. While the County also cites the First Cir cuit's decision in Foley as 
having adopted the "minority view," the court expressly declined to reach 
the issue presented here. Foley, 948 F.2d at 22 n.16 ("We do not 
undertake to decide here whether postjudgment interest begins to accrue 
from the date a judgment expressly and unconditionally establishing a 
party's right to attorneys' fees is enter ed or from the date of a 
judgment 
that establishes the quantum of such fees (in a case where those dates 
differ)."). 
 
8. Although the Seventh Circuit in Fleming allowed post-judgment 
interest to accrue from the date of the district court's quantification of 
the attorney's fee award rather than the date that the court ruled that 
the prevailing party was entitled to fees, its analysis is not all that 
helpful because it is not clear whether the court directly considered the 
issue presented in the instant case. The district court in Fleming entered 
an order in April 1988 stating that the plaintiff was entitled to 
attorney's 
fees, and also allowing, among other things, an adjustment to the billing 
rate in the form of "adding interest from a date 30 days after the end of 
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reasoning of the courts adopting the "majority view" 
persuasive, because they ignore a textual analysis of 
S 1961(a) and, instead, base their result on policies they 
find to underlie post-judgment interest and attorney's fee 
awards. In our view, the correct answer is dictated by the 
text of S 1961(a) and by our case law construing the 
meaning of the term "money judgment," a common legal 
term which we believe is critical to the outcome of this 
appeal. 
 
Because "[t]he starting point for interpr etation of 
[S 1961(a)] is the language itself," Kaiser Aluminum, 494 
U.S. at 835, our analysis begins with the text of the statute, 
which provides in pertinent part that 
 
       [i]nterest shall be allowed on any money judgment in a 
       civil case recovered in a district court. Execution 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
the month in which the services were rendered." Fleming, 898 F.2d at 563 
(emphasis added). The court subsequently enter ed an order quantifying 
the fees on June 24, 1988. 
 
On appeal, the court found that the district court erred in awarding 
interest from a date 30 days after the end of the month in which the 
services were rendered, reasoning that "[p]rior to the date the judgment 
on attorney's fees was entered, plaintif f 's attorney's claim for unpaid 
attorney's fees was unliquidated and, as such, not entitled to interest." 
Id. at 565. The court stated that because the r ecord "clearly indicated" 
that the award of attorney's fees was entered on June 24, 1988, post- 
judgment interest ran from that date. 
 
Fleming does not provide much guidance because it is not clear from 
the opinion whether the plaintiff argued that post-judgment interest 
should have been calculated from the April 1988 date on which the court 
first determined that the plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees. 
Moreover, although the court of appeals mentioned the fact that until the 
"judgment" on attorney's fees is enter ed, the claim for unpaid fees is 
"unliquidated," it seems that it made that observation in the context of 
rejecting the district court's allowance of interest from 30 days after 
the 
services were performed rather than from the entry of the "judgment" on 
attorney's fees. The court of appeals simply did not consider the 
subsidiary issue of which "judgment" that might be. At bottom, we do 
not rely on Fleming because, while the court reached a result consistent 
with our interpretation of S 1961(a) as applied in the attorney's fee 
context, it provided little substantive analysis and did not rely on the 
language of the statute to reach that r esult. 
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       therefor may be levied by the marshal, in any case 
       where, by the law of the State in which such court is 
       held, execution may be levied for interest on judgments 
       recovered in the courts of the State. Such interest shall 
       be calculated from the date of the entry of the 
       judgment. . . . 
 
28 U.S.C. S 1961(a) (emphasis added). "Section 1961(a) 
dictates that interest be awarded." Dunn v. Hovic, 13 F.3d 
58, 60 (3d Cir. 1993). Given the plain language and 
structure of the statute, it is clear that"the judgment" 
referred to in the third quoted sentence is the "money 
judgment" specified in the first. Thus, by its terms, post- 
judgment interest does not begin to run underS 1961(a) 
until the district court enters the judgment at issue, i.e., 
the "money judgment."9 
 
This observation is not dispositive, because the pr oblem 
in this case is that we arguably have two"judgments," i.e., 
(1) the August 11, 1998 order which stated that Eaves was 
entitled to an attorney's fee award, and (2) the January 27, 
2000 order which quantifies the amount of the award. 
Thus, the pivotal question is whether the August 11, 1998 
order qualifies as a "money judgment" such that its entry 
by the clerk of the District Court commences the period 
from which post-judgment interest begins to run. 
 
Section 1961 does not define the term "money judgment." 
Nevertheless, if a statute uses a legal term of art, we must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Although neither party has suggested it, we note that it could be 
argued, at least in theory, that the statute is ambiguous as to whether 
the "judgment" which triggers the post-judgment interest period has to 
have the characteristics of a "money judgment"--the term found in the 
first sentence of S 1961(a). However, the structure of S 1961(a) ties the 
"judgment" referred to in the thir d sentence back to the "money 
judgment . . . recovered in the district court," which, of course, 
provides 
the legal basis for the award of post-judgment interest under the statute. 
Thus in our view, the statute cannot be viewed as ambiguous on this 
point. See Smith v. Fid. Consumer Disc. Co., 898 F.2d 907, 910 (3d Cir. 
1990) ("[S]tatutory construction should halt at such time as the court 
determines the text at issue to be plain and unambiguous") (citing Rubin 
v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)); see also In re Cohen, 106 
F.3d 52, 57 (3d Cir. 1997) (rejecting construction of statute that, in its 
view, "strain[ed] the structure of the statute as a whole"). 
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"presume Congress intended to adopt the term's ordinary 
legal meaning." Omnipoint Corp. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 181 
F.3d 403, 407 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing McDermott Intern. Inc. 
v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 342 (1991)); see also Zubi v. 
AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 227 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., 
dissenting) (citing, inter alia, Omnipoint, 181 F.3d at 407, 
and Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of 
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947) ("[I]f a word is 
obviously transported from another legal sour ce, whether 
the common law or other legislation, it brings its soil with 
it.")). In Penn Terra Limited v. Department of Environmental 
Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir . 1984), we addressed the 
meaning of the term "money judgment" in the context of 
construing the phrase "enforcement of a money judgment" 
found in 11 U.S.C. S 362(b)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Recognizing that Congress failed to provide any guidance as 
to the meaning to be afforded to the phrase "enforcement of 
a money judgment" as it was used in that pr ovision, we 
looked to the established meaning of the ter ms. Id. at 274- 
75 ("Its meaning must therefore be gleaned from the 
commonly accepted usage and from whatever indications of 
congressional intent we find persuasive."). We defined 
"money judgment" in that context in the following manner: 
 
       In common understanding, a money judgment is an 
       order entered by the court or by the clerk, after a 
       verdict has been rendered for [the] plaintiff, which 
       adjudges that the defendant shall pay a sum of money 
       to the plaintiff. Essentially, it need consist of only two 
       elements: (1) an identification of the parties for and 
       against whom judgment is being entered; and (2) a 
       definite and certain designation of the amount which 
       plaintiff is owed by defendant. 
 
Id. at 275 (citing generally 49 C.J.S. Judgments SS 71-82, 
which "describ[ed] proper form of money judgments") 
(emphasis added). 
 
Since Penn Terra, our resear ch reveals that other courts 
have taken a similar approach in determining whether a 
particular judgment constituted a "money judgment," and, 
in various legal contexts have looked to whether the 
judgment at issue required a party to pay a fixed sum. See, 
e.g., EEOC v. Gurnee Inns, Inc., 956 F.2d 146, 149 (7th Cir. 
 
                                12 
  
1992) (where district court entered judgment that awarded 
plaintiffs backpay in definite amounts, less applicable 
payroll deductions, and directed employer to deduct payroll 
taxes and deliver checks to plaintiffs, court rejected 
employer's argument that court's judgment was not "money 
judgment" under S 1961(a), stating that"the awards did not 
lose their character as sums certain simply because they 
were subject to the mechanical task of computing payroll 
deductions"); In re Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 
1175, 1186 (5th Cir. 1986) (following Penn Terra's definition 
of "money judgment"); In re V alencia, 213 B.R. 594, 596 (D. 
Colo. 1997) (affirming bankruptcy court's entry of money 
judgment fixing amount of damages debtor owed in 
dischargeability proceeding and noting that bankruptcy 
court's equitable jurisdiction allowed it to "r ender a money 
judgment in an amount certain"); In r e Dow Corning Corp., 
237 B.R. 380, 386 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) (in determining 
whether order pursuant to S 502(b) of Bankruptcy Code 
constituted "money judgment" from which post-judgment 
interest would run, court stated "[a]s one might expect, a 
`money judgment' consists of three elements: it must be a 
judgment; entitling the plaintiff to a specified sum of 
money; and such entitlement must be against an 
identifiable party"); In re Devitt , 126 B.R. 212, 215 (Bankr. 
D. Md. 1991) (holding that bankruptcy court had 
jurisdiction to enter "money judgment," i.e., "judgment in 
an amount certain," in dischargeability pr oceeding). 
 
We further note that, although not cited by the parties, 
we find the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir cuit's 
opinion in Happy Chef Systems, Inc. v. John Hancock 
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 933 F.2d 1433 (8th Cir. 1991), 
instructive on this issue. There, as her e, the parties 
disputed which of two "judgments" commenced the post- 
judgment interest period applicable under S 1961(a). In 
Happy Chef Systems, the landlord sought a declaration 
that the tenant breached its lease with the landlord, and 
was obligated to perform its lease obligations. After the 
district court determined that the landlor d was entitled to 
a judgment requiring the tenant to perfor m its lease 
obligations, the landlord filed a motion seeking 
"supplemental relief " under 28 U.S.C.S 2202 in the form of 
money damages. On February 21, 1990, the district court 
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entered a judgment and order that the tenant was obligated 
to perform its lease obligations. It also granted the 
landlord's motion for supplemental relief, but did not 
quantify the amount of damages because it believed that 
the trial record was not adequate to enter a judgment on 
the amount to be awarded. Subsequently, on May 25, 1990, 
the district court entered an order which quantified the 
landlord's damage award, and awarded post-judgment 
interest from February 21, 1990--the date on which the 
court first determined that the landlor d was entitled to 
supplemental relief under S 2202. Id.  at 1435. 
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir cuit 
reversed the award of post-judgment inter est from February 
21, 1990. The court held that the district court err ed in 
awarding post-judgment interest fr om the date that it first 
determined that the landlord was entitled to damages 
under S 2202. It stated that "[s]ection 1961(a) does not 
provide for interest until a money judgment has been 
entered. Therefore, interest at the post-judgment interest 
rate should begin on May 25, 1990 [the date the amount 
was quantified], not February 21 of that year ." Id. at 1437. 
 
The court's conclusion in Happy Chef Systems supports 
our construction of the phrase "any money judgment" in 
S 1961(a), which requires that the judgment at issue award 
a fixed amount of fees to the prevailing party in order to 
trigger the post-judgment interest period. Rather than 
finding that the post-judgment interest period commences 
from the date that the district court deter mined in a 
general sense that the landlord was entitled to a damages 
award, the court in Happy Chef Systems stated that 
S 1961(a) requires the entry of a money judgment, which, as 
we explained in Penn Terra, is commonly understood to 
require an award of a fixed sum to the prevailing party. Cf. 
In re Burlington N., Inc. Employment Pract. Litig., 810 F.2d 
601, 609 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting ar gument that plaintiffs 
were entitled to post-judgment interest fr om date district 
court approved consent decree setting forth plaintiffs' right 
to recover reasonable attorney's fee, stating that S 1961(a) 
only authorized interest from date of entry of judgment). 
And because we read the reference to the "entry of the 
judgment" in the third sentence of S 1961(a) as referring 
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back to the "money judgment" specified in the first 
sentence of S 1961(a), it necessarily follows that post- 
judgment interest begins to run on a judgment awarding 
attorney's fees where that judgment fixes the amount owed 
to the prevailing party. 
 
We recognize that in Penn Terra, we did not define the 
term "money judgment" in the context of a dispute 
surrounding the meaning of the term as it is used in 28 
U.S.C. S 1961(a). Rather, we wer e interpreting the scope of 
11 U.S.C. S 362(b)(5). Nevertheless, given that our 
construction of "money judgment" was based on the 
common legal meaning ascribed to that term, our definition 
in Penn Terra certainly is instructive in ascertaining what 
Congress intended in using the same phrase inS 1961(a). 
Here, as in Penn Terra, Congr ess has not provided any 
definition for the term as it is used inS 1961(a), thus 
requiring us to look to the established meaning of that 
term. Omnipoint, 181 F.3d at 407 (where statute uses legal 
terms of art, we must "presume Congr ess intended to adopt 
the term's ordinary legal meaning"); Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 
275 ("Where Congress uses terms that have accumulated 
settled meaning under either equity or common law, a court 
must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that 
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of 
these terms."). 
 
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the County that 
S 1961(a) simply does not permit post-judgment interest on 
an attorney's fee award to run fr om the date that the court 
initially determines that the prevailing party is entitled to 
an award if the amount was not also quantified and 
included in that judgment. It necessarily follows that the 
"money judgment" in this case was not enter ed until 
January 27, 2000--the date on which the court quantified 
the amount of the attorney's fees and awar ded plaintiff a 
fixed sum. Put differently, the August 11, 1998 judgment 
stating that Eaves was entitled to an award of attorney's 
fees could not have been the judgment triggering the post- 
judgment interest period because the Court's statement 
that Eaves was entitled to such an award cannot be 
considered the functional equivalent of a judicial finding 
that the County was liable to Eaves to pay a fixed sum of 
attorney's fees. 
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In reaching this conclusion, we have not overlooked the 
fact that we stated in Penn Terra that the phrase "money 
judgment" commonly refers to a judgment entered upon a 
jury verdict, while our analysis in this case imports that 
definition into a situation where the "judgment" at issue 
actually resolved a motion for attorney's fees, an ancillary 
issue to the underlying dispute between the parties. We are 
not troubled by this distinction, however , because it is not 
disputed that a judgment awarding attor ney's fees 
theoretically could qualify as a "money judgment" on which 
post-judgment interest could be awarded under S 1961(a), 
provided that it has the requisite attributes of a "money 
judgment." Given that we treat judgments awarding 
attorney's fees as we would any other "money judgment," 
we see no principled basis for according a dif ferent meaning 
to the term simply because the award at issue here involves 
attorney's fees rather than money damages stemming from 
a jury verdict. For our purposes, the essential aspect of our 
construction of the term "money judgment" in Penn Terra is 
that it must be comprised of "a definite and certain 
designation of the amount which plaintiff is owed by 
defendant." Thus, it makes no differ ence that the actual 
judgment at issue stemmed from a fee petition rather than 
a jury verdict. 
 
We further observe that our construction of the phrase 
"any money judgment" in S 1961(a) is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's analysis in Kaiser Aluminum . There the 
plaintiff, Bonjorno, initially secur ed a liability verdict 
against the defendant, Kaiser Aluminum, on August 16, 
1979. The jury then assessed damages against Kaiser 
Aluminum on August 21, 1979, and the district court 
entered judgment on the verdict on August 22, 1979. 
Ultimately, the district court concluded that the evidence 
did not support the damage award and granted Kaiser 
Aluminum's motion for a new trial as to damages only. On 
December 2, 1981, the jury found in favor of Bonjor no, and 
awarded damages. The district court enter ed a judgment on 
the second jury verdict on December 4, 1981. Kaiser 
Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 830-31. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the district court granted Kaiser 
Aluminum's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the 
 
                                16 
  
verdict as to a portion of the second damages verdict. 
However, on appeal, we reversed the court's determination 
on that point and reinstated the December 4, 1981 
judgment on the second verdict. On remand, the district 
court awarded post-judgment interest on the damages 
award from December 2, 1981, the date of the second 
damages verdict after the retrial. That decision, in turn, 
was appealed, and one of the issues raised in the appeal 
was whether post-judgment interest ran fr om the date of 
the December 2, 1981 verdict or the December 4, 1981 
judgment on the verdict, albeit a differ ence of only two 
days. See Kaiser Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 571-72 & n.9. 
 
Following our previous opinion in Poleto v. Consolidated 
Rail Corp., 826 F.2d 1270 (3d Cir . 1987), we held that post- 
judgment interest ran from the December 2, 1981 verdict. 
Id. Poleto had looked to the purpose of the post-judgment 
interest statute and the structure of Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 58, and found that both supported a broad 
reading of S 1961(a) that allowed post-judgment interest to 
run from the date of the verdict wher e there was a delay in 
the district court's entry of the judgment on the verdict. 
Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280. 
 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Court r ejected the 
Poleto rule, grounding its analysis on the plain language of 
S 1961(a). In reaching its result, the Court explained: 
 
       Those courts that have determined that inter est should 
       run from the verdict have looked to the policy 
       underlying the postjudgment interest statute-- 
       compensation of the plaintiff for the loss of the use of 
       the money--in reaching their conclusion that interest 
       should run from the date of the verdict despite the 
       language of the statute. 
 
          . . . . 
 
        The starting point for interpretation of a statute is 
       the language itself. . . . Both the original and the 
       amended versions of S 1961 refer specifically to the 
       "date of judgment," which indicates a date certain. 
       Neither alludes to the date of the verdict, and there is 
       no legislative history that would indicate a 
       congressional intent that interest run fr om the date of 
 
                                17 
  
       verdict rather than the date of judgment. Even though 
       denial of interest from verdict to judgment may result 
       in the plaintiff bearing the burden of the loss of the use 
       of the money from verdict to judgment, the allocation 
       of the costs accruing from litigation is a matter for the 
       legislature, not the courts. 
 
Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 834-35. 
 
In the instant case, Eaves makes a policy ar gument 
strikingly similar to the one we accepted in Poleto but the 
Supreme Court rejected in Kaiser Aluminum. She contends 
that we should hold that post-judgment inter est on her 
attorney's fee award began to accrue on August 11, 1998, 
because the District Court expressly deter mined on that 
date that she was legally entitled to a monetary award, and 
it ultimately fixed the amount in its January 27, 2000 
order. Put differently, Eaves urges that we find in her favor 
because, since August 11, 1998, the County has had the 
use of the money that the Court eventually fixed as her fee 
award on January 27, 2000. 
 
Given the tenor of the Supreme Court's analysis in Kaiser 
Aluminum, we are unpersuaded by Eaves's ar gument. Her 
contention in this regard is bottomed on the concept that, 
beginning on August 11, 1998, the County had the use of 
monies to which she was legally entitled. But in Kaiser 
Aluminum, the Court was unmoved by the fact that its 
denial of post-judgment interest from the date of the verdict 
to the date of the entry of the judgment might r esult in the 
plaintiff bearing the burden of the loss of the use of his or 
her money during the interim. Moreover, the Court 
expressly rejected our analysis in Poleto, which, like Eaves's 
argument here, looked to the policies behind the award of 
post-judgment interest and found that they supported a 
broader interpretation of S 1961(a) than the plain language 
of the statute allowed. 
 
Here too, we cannot ignore the plain meaning of the term 
"money judgment" and its implications in this case simply 
because our interpretation of S 1961(a) may result in the 
plaintiff 's bearing the burden of the loss of the use of the 
attorney's fee funds to which she was legally entitled from 
the date that the District Court declared her entitlement to 
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the date that the award was quantified. In our view, the 
Court's analysis in Kaiser Aluminum demonstrates that we 
are not at liberty to ignore the literal language of S 1961(a), 
notwithstanding the fact that the result might be that 
prevailing parties suffer adverse consequences from the 
district court's delay in fixing the amount of attorney's fees 
to be awarded. See MidAmerica, 962 F .2d at 1476 ("[W]e see 
no way to square MidAmerica's request for interest on an 
unliquidated attorneys' fees award with Kaiser."); see also 
Magee v. United States Lines, Inc., 976 F .2d 821, 823 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (pointing out that Kaiser Aluminum interpreted 
S 1961(a) literally, explaining that "[i]n Kaiser, the Supreme 
Court rejected the argument, which the district court 
herein apparently found persuasive, that under equitable 
principles post-judgment interest should be computed from 
the time that the court might have entered judgment, i.e., 
promptly following the jury's verdict."). And reading the 
statute literally requires the entry of a"money judgment" to 
commence the period of post-judgment interest on an 
attorney's fee award, which here occurred on January 27, 
2000 when the District Court quantified the amount the 
County owed. 
 
In reaching our result, we also ar e informed by a portion 
of our analysis in Kaiser Aluminum that was not disturbed 
by the Supreme Court on appeal. In the pr oceedings before 
us, the plaintiff suggested several dates fr om which the 
accrual of post-judgment interest could have commenced, 
including August 16, 1979, the date the jury deliver ed its 
liability verdict. But as we previously mentioned, we 
followed Poleto and agreed with the district court that post- 
judgment interest ran from December 2, 1981, the date of 
the second damages verdict after retrial. In reaching that 
conclusion, we necessarily rejected Bonjor no's suggested 
date of August 16, 1979, and, moreover, ruled out the 
possibility that post-judgment interest would run from 
August 22, 1979, the date of the first damages judgment 
that was subsequently overturned on Kaiser Aluminum's 
post-trial motion. With respect to those two possibilities, we 
explained: 
 
       Bonjorno argues that interest should accrue from the 
       date of the original liability verdict--August 1979-- 
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       because liability was ultimately affirmed[by the Court 
       of Appeals]. However, the August 16, 1979 verdict on 
       liability alone was insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
       54(c) to allow or require the court to enter judgment. 
       Little if any authority supports the position that post- 
       judgment interest accrues from the date of an 
       unliquidated verdict or from a judgment vacated by a 
       district court which is never reinstated, modified or 
       even appealed. The vast majority of cases which 
       construe section 1961 to allow interest to run from a 
       verdict rather than a "judgment" involve verdicts which 
       include an assessment of damages where judgment is 
       later entered on the verdict amount. . . . This reasoning 
       weighs against permitting Bonjorno to r ecover interest 
       from August 16, 1979 (the date of the unliquidated 
       liability verdict) or August 22, 1979 (the date of the 
       first damage verdict which was vacated and never 
       reinstated, increased, reduced, or even appealed). 
 
Kaiser Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 570-71 (emphasis added).10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. This aspect of our holding in Kaiser Aluminum remains intact after 
Supreme Court's rejection of the rule we adopted in Poleto. The Supreme 
Court specifically rejected the plaintif f 's argument that post-judgment 
interest should have run from August 22, 1979, the date the court 
entered judgment on the first liability and damages verdicts, because the 
damages verdict subsequently was set aside as not supported by the 
evidence. Using language from Poleto and our opinion in Kaiser 
Aluminum, the Court reasoned that "wher e the judgment was not 
supported by the evidence, the damages have not been ascertained in 
any meaningful way." Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 836; see also id. 
(" `[T]he purpose of post-judgment interest is to compensate the 
successful plaintiff for being deprived of compensation for the loss from 
the time between the ascertainment of the damage and the payment by 
the defendant.' ") (quoting Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280). The Court's 
reference to damages being "ascertained" is taken from Poleto and our 
opinion in Kaiser Aluminum, both of which r ecognized that damages are 
"meaningfully ascertained" once the amount owed to the prevailing party 
has been determined in a court proceeding. Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280 
(citing Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 642 F.2d 514, 618-19 (D.C. 
Cir. 1980) (Mikva, J., dissenting)); see also Kaiser Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 
570 (noting that, even under rule adopted in Poleto, verdicts which are 
sufficient to commence the post-judgment inter est period under 
S 1961(a) must include an "assessment of damages"). 
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Our reasoning on this point in Kaiser Aluminum weighs 
against Eaves's assertion that post-judgment inter est 
should run from the date that the district court ruled she 
was entitled to fees. For purposes of determining the date 
from which post-judgment interest should run, the August 
11, 1998 order stating that Eaves was entitled to attorney's 
fees and costs is the functional equivalent of the August 16, 
1979 unliquidated liability verdict in Kaiser Aluminum 
which we found insufficient to commence the post- 
judgment interest period under S 1961(a). The import of the 
August 11, 1998 order was that the County was liable to 
Eaves for some unspecified portion of her attor ney's fees, 
but that, as of that date, her claim for those fees was not 
"liquidated" because it had not been r educed to a fixed 
amount.11 See MidAmerica, 962 F.2d at 1477. Similarly, the 
August 16, 1979 liability verdict in Kaiser Aluminum 
amounted only to a finding that Kaiser Aluminum was 
liable to Bonjorno on the merits of the claim under the 
applicable law. Until the damages verdict occurred on 
August 21, 1979, the plaintiff 's claim against Kaiser 
Aluminum was unliquidated in the sense that the amount 
of monetary damages owed had not been fixed. See Poleto, 
826 F.2d at 1280 ("The verdict [of liability and damages] 
assesses damages up to the time that it is r endered; 
however, payment does not occur immediately upon return 
of the verdict. Post-judgment interest r epresents the cost of 
withholding the amount owed the plaintiff once that sum 
has been determined in a court proceeding.") (emphasis 
added). 
 
As the Supreme Court's analysis in Kaiser Aluminum 
confirms, the pivotal event for the commencement of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. Cf. Pollice v. Nat'l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379, 395-96 (3d Cir. 
2000) (explaining that a "fixed or liquidated claim" is one where the 
damages are "certain" and stating that pr ejudgment interest on 
liquidated claim carries interest at legal rate from time debt becomes 
due) (applying Pennsylvania law); E.C. Er nst, Inc. v. Koppers Co., Inc., 
626 F.2d 324, 332-33 (3d Cir. 1980) (determining whether award of 
prejudgment interest was appropriate, stating that "only question is 
whether the damages were sufficiently fixed to be liquidated," and 
finding in plaintiff 's favor because"the sum due could be fixed by fairly 
objective means") (applying Pennsylvania law). 
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post-judgment interest period is the entry of the 
"judgment," more specifically, the"money judgment" to 
which S 1961(a) applies. And, as our discussion in Kaiser 
Aluminum demonstrates, the operative judgment must set 
forth the court's (or jury's) assessment of monetary 
damages arising out of the claim or right giving rise to the 
defendant's liability for the amount awarded. Kaiser 
Aluminum, 865 F.2d at 570; Poleto, 826 F.2d at 1280; see 
In re Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1177 (stating that post- 
judgment interest compensates plaintiff for loss between 
determination of damages and defendant's payment); see 
also Turner v. Japan Lines, Ltd., 702 F .2d 752, 756 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (explaining that prejudgment interest 
accommodates plaintiff for loss from time of breach or 
injury to date of ascertainment of damages, i.e. , damages 
verdict, and post-judgment interest accommodates plaintiff 
for period from date of ascertainment of damages until 
payment by defendant), abrogated on other grounds by 
Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 834-35. 
 
We recognize, of course, that our appr oach in this case is 
different from that of the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh and Federal Circuits, and thus that 
the weight of authority is against our position. W e 
nevertheless reject the majority view because, in most 
cases, the courts predicated their result on a broader 
interpretation of S 1961(a) based primarily on policy 
considerations rather than the plain language of the statute.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We say that "most cases" wer e grounded in policy in view of the fact 
that the Eleventh Circuit took a differ ent approach in BankAtlantic v. 
Blythe Eastman Paine Webber. Ther e the court held that post-judgment 
interest on an attorney's fee award under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 ran from the 
date the district court entered the order establishing the plaintiff 's 
right 
to recover attorney's fees as a discovery sanction rather than the date 
that the district court quantified the amount. See BankAtlantic, 12 F.3d 
at 1048. Without mentioning Copper Liquor , Mathis or Jenkins, the court 
reasoned that "[t]he proper date upon which interest shall be calculated 
for the sanction amount is July 10, 1989, the date of the sanction order" 
because Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) defined judgment as including "a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies." Id. at 1053. The court's 
analysis thus apparently was based on its view that the defendants 
could have appealed the initial order awar ding discovery sanctions. 
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Additionally, we find it significant that the initial two cases 
espousing the "majority view" preceded the Supreme 
Court's literal interpretation of S 1961(a) in Kaiser 
Aluminum, which we view as dictating our r esult. See 
MidAmerica, 962 F.2d at 1476. 
 
For example, in the initial decision addressing the 
question of accrual of post-judgment interest on an 
attorney's fee award, the Fifth Cir cuit in Copper Liquor v. 
Adolph Coors & Co., held that post-judgment interest on an 
award of fees and/or costs runs from the date of the 
"judgment establishing the right to fees or costs, as the 
case may be."13 See Copper Liquor, 701 F.2d at 545. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
We are unpersuaded by the Eleventh Cir cuit's analysis. First, although 
it is true that Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(a) defines "judgment," the definition 
provides that it is to be applied to the ter m "as used in these rules," 
and 
states only that it "includes" a decree or any order from which an appeal 
lies. Thus, the Rule itself does not purport to define "judgment" as used 
in statutory provisions such as, for example,S 1961(a), and it thus 
leaves room for the possibility that the ter m "judgment" as used in 
S 1961(a) could include a district court or der that does not fall within 
the 
narrow class of a "decree and any or der from which an appeal lies." In 
re Lower Lake Erie, 998 F.2d at 1177-78. 
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, by fashioning a rule that ties 
the commencement of the post-judgment interest period to the entry of 
the "judgment" as defined in Rule 54(a), the BankAtlantic court 
overlooked the fact that S 1961(a)'s use of the term "judgment" in the 
third sentence is a shorthand refer ence back to the "money judgment" 
specified in the first sentence of that subsection. Thus, in looking only 
to Rule 54(a)'s definition of "judgment," the court did not consider what 
we see as the real issue--whether the district court's order resolving the 
motion for sanctions was, in actuality, a "money judgment," given that 
the order did not set a fixed amount of money to be paid to the plaintiff. 
While we recognize that the "money judgment" at issue in a given case 
also might qualify as a "judgment" for purposes of determining finality 
under Rule 54(a), there is no legal basis for concluding that S 1961(a) 
can be read as allowing post-judgment inter est only on "judgments" as 
defined exclusively by Rule 54(a). Cf. McDonald v. McCarthy, 966 F.2d 
112, 115 (3d Cir. 1992) (looking to advisory committee's note to Fed. R. 
App. 39 which indicated that reference to"costs" found therein should 
be defined according to 28 U.S.C. S 1920). 
 
13. In Devex, we relied upon Copper Liquor to hold that a prevailing party 
who is awarded taxable costs is entitled to post-judgment interest on the 
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Notably, however, the court did not pr ovide any reasoning 
as to why it adopted the rule that it did, and seemed to rely 
on equitable considerations to justify the r esult.14 See id. at 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
costs award. Devex, 749 F.2d at 1026. We note, however, that the issue 
presented in Devex was not the date fr om which post-judgment interest 
should run on an award of costs. Rather , the defendant argued 
unsuccessfully that post-judgment interest on an award of costs was not 
available at all under S 1961(a). We need not, and do not, address the 
open issue of the date from which post-judgment interest would run on 
costs taxed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1920, see, e.g., BankAtlantic, 12 
F.3d at 1047; Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 855 F.2d 
794, 799 (11th Cir. 1988), because the District Court's order in the 
instant case did not award post-judgment inter est on its $582 award of 
taxable costs, and Eaves has not challenged that ruling. 
 
14. We are aware that the Fifth Circuit has considered whether its ruling 
in Copper Liquor was overruled by Kaiser Aluminum, and has determined 
that Copper Liquor remains good law. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 
F.3d at 332. The Fifth Circuit r ead Kaiser Aluminum as consistent with 
the result in Copper Liquor based on the Supreme Court's statement that 
"where the judgment is not supported by the evidence, the damages have 
not been ascertained in any meaningful way." Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. 
at 836. The Fifth Circuit explained: "[b]ecause the earlier judgment in 
Kaiser was invalid, the party had no entitlement to damages on that 
date. Thus, the reasoning in Kaiser is consistent with Copper Liquor's 
mandate that interest should not accrue until the party becomes entitled 
to the award." Louisiana Power & Light , 50 F.3d at 332. 
 
We agree that on the surface, Copper Liquor can be reconciled with 
Kaiser Aluminum to the extent that the Court's statement in Kaiser 
Aluminum suggests that until the second damages judgment was 
entered, the plaintiff had not established, as an evidentiary matter, that 
she was "entitled" to any monetary damages. Nevertheless, our careful 
review of the entire discussion in Kaiser Aluminum confirms that, on 
balance, the result in that case must be viewed as undermining the 
analysis underlying the Copper Liquor rule. First, as we previously 
mentioned, the rule in Copper Liquor cannot be squared with the plain 
meaning of the term "any money judgment" found in S 1961(a). Second, 
and perhaps more importantly, as we indicated in note 10, the Court's 
reference to the point at which the damages are "meaningfully 
ascertained" came from Poleto, which in turn explained that damages are 
"ascertained" at the point at which the sum owed "has been determined 
in a court proceeding,"--in that case, by the damages verdict. Poleto, 826 
F.2d at 1280. Against the backdrop of Poleto and our opinion in Kaiser 
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544 (observing, in overruling Carpa, Inc. v. W ard Foods, 
567 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978), that"because a dollar today 
is worth more than a dollar in the futur e, the only way [a 
party] can be made whole is to award him interest from the 
time he should have received the money"). 
 
Subsequently, in Mathis v. Spears, the Federal Circuit 
followed Copper Liquor because, in its view,"the provision 
for calculating interest from the entry of the judgment 
deters the use of the appellate process by the judgment 
debtor solely as a means of prolonging its fr ee use of money 
owed. . . ." See Mathis, 857 F.2d at 760. However, the 
analysis in Mathis is inapposite given that the rule we have 
approved today would not encourage litigants tofile 
frivolous appeals of the attorney's fee awar d. Indeed, we 
already have held in Institutionalized Juveniles that in 
certain circumstances, post-judgment inter est on an 
attorney's fee award runs from the date of the original 
judgment even if that judgment was modified on appeal. 
See Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 927. Thus, the 
equitable consideration identified in Mathis  is not 
implicated, as we are not concerned in this case with the 
time period between the judgment in the district court and 
the judgment in the court of appeals, but, rather , must 
choose between two judgments entered in the district court 




Aluminum, we read the Supreme Court's opinion in Kaiser Aluminum as 
simply having extended the "ascertainment of the damages" rationale 
first discussed in Poleto to the facts pr esented in that case. Therefore, 
rather than viewing that discussion in Kaiser Aluminum solely from the 
standpoint of when the plaintiff became "entitled" to damages as an 
evidentiary matter, it could be read as also predicated on the fact that 
the damages were not "ascertained" until the second judgment because 
the first damages verdict had been overtur ned, thus leaving no valid 
judicial determination of the sum actually owed to the plaintiff. At all 
events, when considered in light of Poleto  and our discussion in Kaiser 
Aluminum, we are convinced that the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Power & 
Light Co. focused too narrowly on "entitlement" as the key to applying 
the "ascertainment of the damage" principle in Kaiser Aluminum in the 
attorney's fee context. 
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Moreover, the Eighth Circuit in Jenkins v. State of 
Missouri, and the Ninth Circuit in Friend v. Kolodzieczak, 
both relied on policy justifications to per mit post-judgment 
interest to accrue on an unquantified attor ney's fee 
judgment without considering the impact of the plain 
language of S 1961(a). See Kolodzieczak , 72 F.3d at 1386; 
Jenkins, 931 F.2d at 1273. In Jenkins , for example, the 
court observed that the award of interest serves the "make 
whole" objective of fee awards in civil rights cases and 
cautioned that "if the accrual of post-judgment interest is 
delayed until fee awards are quantified,. . . attorneys are 
not fully compensated for their successful ef forts, [and] 
they may be reluctant to take on complex and expensive 
litigation." Id. at 1276-77. The court in Kolodzieczak 
similarly observed that allowing post-judgment inter est to 
accrue from the judgment establishing the right to fees 
ensures that civil rights attorneys ar e fully compensated for 
the delay in payment. See Kolodzieczak, 72 F .3d at 1392.15 
 
In our view, however, the rule that we have adopted does 
not frustrate the "make whole" objective of attorney fee 
awards in civil rights cases. While we r ecognize that our 
construction of S 1961(a) limits the amount of post- 
judgment interest that accrues on an attor ney's fee 
judgment, we do not hold today that post-judgment interest 
on an attorney's fee award is not available in general. 
Rather, we find only that post-judgment interest does not 
begin to run until the court fixes the amount owed--in 
other words, it commences upon the entry of the"money 
judgment." 
 
Moreover, while the courts in Jenkins and Kolodzieczak 
correctly point out the importance of fully compensating 
civil rights attorneys who take on complex litigation, the 
courts did not consider the fact that the same r esult may 
be obtained if the district court applies an appr opriate form 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The court in Kolodzieczak actually adopted the district court's 
analysis of the legal issues in its entirety. The district court, in turn, 
relied upon another district court decision in reaching its conclusion 
that post-judgment interest on an attor ney's fee award runs from the 
date of entitlement rather than the date of quantification. See 
Kolodzieczak, 72 F.3d at 1392 (citing,inter alia, Finkelstein v. Bergna, 
804 F. Supp. 1235, 1239 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). 
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of a delay-in-payment adjustment to the lodestar amount in 
calculating the fee award. The Supreme Court has equated 
the adjustment allowed for the delay in payment in civil 
rights cases with an award of prejudgment interest on the 
attorney's fee award. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 
282 n.3 (1989); Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 
322 (1986). We similarly have explained that the delay-in- 
payment adjustment "is designed to compensate the 
attorney for the time gap between the actual expenditure of 
services and the fee award," and that post-judgment 
interest covers the delay in receipt during the period from 
the fee determination to payment. Black Grievance Comm. 
v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 802 F.2d 648, 656 (3d Cir. 1986), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds , 483 U.S. 1015 
(1987). In Keenan v. City of Philadelphia, 983 F.2d 459 (3d 
Cir. 1992), we noted that "in granting plaintiffs 
compensation for delay, two methods may be used: basing 
the fee award on current rates or adjusting the fee based on 
historical rates to reflect its present value." Id. at 476. 
 
Indeed, where the plaintiff presents adequate evidentiary 
support documenting the costs incurred because of the 
delay in receipt of funds, such enhancements ar e permitted 
for the very purpose of compensating counsel for the delay 
in receipt of the fees until the litigation has concluded. See 
Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 888 F.2d 975, 985 (3d Cir. 
1989); Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F .2d at 923 
(discussing factors informing court's discr etion when 
awarding delay in payment enhancement); cf. In re 
Burlington N., 810 F.2d at 609 (r ejecting plaintiffs' request 
for prejudgment interest to account for delay between filing 
of fee petition and judgment awarding attor ney's fees in 
part because "[i]n the absence of evidence, we have no basis 
on which to conclude that payment based on 1984 rates 
compensated lead counsel only for delay in payment up to 
that time") (emphasis added). Thus, an appr opriate 
adjustment for the delay in payment would ensur e that 
attorneys are fully compensated for their efforts and also 
would be consistent with S 1961(a)'s r equirement that post- 
judgment interest does not begin to accrue until the entry 
of the money judgment.16 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
16. Although the District Court did not addr ess it, but given its 
apparent 
concern as to who should bear the cost of delay, we leave open the 
 




Given the foregoing analysis, we hold that pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1961(a), post-judgment interest on an attorney's 
fee award runs from the date that the District Court enters 
a judgment quantifying the amount of fees owed to the 
prevailing party rather than the date that the Court finds 
that the party is entitled to recover fees, if those 
determinations are made separately. Her e, the District 
Court intended to compensate Eaves for the delay in 
payment occasioned by court backlog from August 11, 
1998, the date of the District Court's judgment stating that 
she was entitled to attorney's fees, to January 27, 2000, 
the date the Court fixed the amount owed. W e hold that the 
District Court erred in awarding post-judgment interest 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
possibility that on remand, the Court might consider compensating 
Eaves for the delay that occurred in this case by applying our precedents 
permitting an adjustment to the lodestar amount to account for the 
"delay in payment" factor often present in civil rights cases. See, e.g. 
Gulfstream III Assoc., Inc. v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 995 F.2d 414, 
425-26 (3d Cir. 1993); Keenan, 983 F.2d at 476; Blum, 888 F.2d at 984- 
85; Student Pub. Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. AT&T Bell 
Labs, 842 F.2d 1436, 1453-54 (3d Cir . 1988); Black Grievance Comm., 
802 F.2d at 655-56; Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 923-34. In 
pointing out the possibility for such an enhancement on remand, we 
have not overlooked the fact that the District Court, on January 27, 
2000, calculated the lodestar by using counsels'"current" billing rates 
(as of the date of the fee petition in May 1998) rather than their 
historical rates charged for services at the time they were rendered, and 
that the use of such rates may dictate that no enhancement is 
warranted. See Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 284; Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 
F.2d at 923 n.41 (dicta); Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 893 n.23 
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). But see In re Cont'l Illinois Sec. Litig., 962 
F.2d 
566, 571 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Smith v. Vill. of Maywood, 17 F.3d 
219, 221 (7th Cir. 1994). Moreover , while we realize that the District 
Court did award a 15 percent contingency enhancement under the 
NJLAD, we note that such an enhancement is distinct from an 
adjustment to account for a delay in payment. See Pennsylvania v. 
Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987) 
("Although delay and the risk of nonpayment ar e often mentioned in the 
same breadth, adjusting for the former is a distinct issue that is not 
involved in this case. We do not suggest . . . that adjustments for delay 
are inconsistent with the typical fee shifting statute."). 
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under S 1961(a) from the entry of the August 11, 1998 
order to accomplish that goal, because that or der did not 
constitute a "money judgment" from which post-judgment 
interest could run. 
 
Accordingly, we will VACATE the District Court's January 
27, 2000 order and remand the matter to the District Court 
for the entry of an appropriate order consistent with this 
opinion. We will also AFFIRM the District Court's rulings 
with respect to the other issues the County pr esented in 
this appeal. 
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